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1. Introduction  
In 2010, Burger King decided to stop 
purchasing palm oil from PT. Sinar Mas Agro 
Resources and Technology (SMART), because 
the suppling company has involved in the 
destruction of tropical forests, and other 
following consequences which contributed to 
global climate change or global warming 
(Neviana, 2010). The issues regarding climate 
change and its impact have led to the emergence 
of regulations to reduce the number of 
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The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of earnings management on 
carbon emission disclosure with corporate governance as a moderating variable. 
The population was companies in the sector of industry and chemical, agriculture, 
energy, transportation listed on the Indonesia stock exchange (IDX). Based on the 
purposive sampling method, 12 companies were selected as the samples (60 firm-
year observations). The data analysis technique used is the moderate regression 
analysis (MRA). The results showed that the earnings management has a significant 
positive effect on carbon emission disclosure. The board of commissioner size 
moderates the influence of the earnings management on the carbon emission 
disclosure. The board of directors has a role in affecting the carbon emission 
disclosure, while the independent commissioners, the institutional ownership, and 
the audit committee meetings do not have a significant effect on weakening the 
effect of profit management on carbon emission disclosure.  
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greenhouse gases in every country (Borghei-
Ghomi & Leung, 2013). 
As the gas emissions contributors, companies 
are encouraged to disclose information about 
carbon emissions they produce. Several countries 
such as the European Union, the United States, 
Canada, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand 
have already mandatory regulations in place 
regarding carbon emission disclosure (World 
Resources Institute, 2015).  
Since 2013, the Indonesian government has 
continuously released regulations to reduce carbon 
emissions and to attain sustainable development as 
its contribution to overcome global warming 
problems (Faisal et al., 2018). In Indonesia, 
concern on the carbon emission disclosure has 
emerged after the government issued Presidential 
Regulation No. 61/2011 concerning the National 
Action Plan for Reducing Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions (or RAN-GRK), and  Presidential 
Regulatio No. 71 (2011) regarding the 
implementation of national Greenhouse Gas 
Inventory (Nainggolan & Rohman, 2015). 
However, the carbon emission disclosure in 
Indonesia is still voluntary, thus every company 
has the flexibility in determining what information 
they will not disclose and consider as relevant 
information for the decision making process.  
The carbon emission disclosure is a form of 
accountability that used to explain the impacts of 
corporate operational activities on climate change. 
However, the disclosure of carbon emissions can 
contain several risks for corporate, such as 
increasing operating costs (Coburn et al., 2011), 
decreasing market value (Aggarwal & Dow, 
2011), and giving managers opportunities to 
engage in earnings management (Prior et al., 
2008).  
According to experts, managers who involve 
in earning management practice might use 
corporate social responsibility disclosure to keep 
their position in the company and increase the 
confidence from stakeholders (Prior et al., 2008). 
The results of previous studies unveiled that good 
corporate governance can support management to 
carry out activities that benefit themselves (Chen 
et al., 2007; Dechow et al., 1996; Klein, 2002; 
Mansor et al., 2013). The corporate governance 
mechanism is expected to control management 
performance and determine carbon emissions 
disclosure policies. Choi et al., (2013) and Elyasih 
et al., (2018) showed that the effectiveness of 
corporate governance is the main key to control 
the carbon emissions disclosure in the annual 
report.  
Sun et al., (2010) demostrated the role of 
corporate governance mechanism as a moderation 
variable, proxied by the number of audit 
committee meetings. It weaken the effect of 
earnings management on corporate environmental 
disclosure, while board size does not have such 
impact. Besides, the earnings management, 
measured by discretionary accruals, does not have 
a significant effect on corporate environmental 
disclosure (Sun et al., 2010). Meanwhile, Faisal et 
al., (2018) found that carbon emissions disclosure 
is one effort done by managers to respond to 
stakeholders’ pressure.  
This study aims to investigate the effect of 
earnings management on carbon emissions 
disclosure with the role of corporate governance as 
a moderating variable. Unlike previous studies, for 
instance Sun et al., (2010), the carbon emissions 
disclosure was measured using an index developed 
by Choi et al., (2013), as a part of the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP). The carbon emissions 
questionnaire issued by CDP can be used in 
various countries because it has a standard of 
voluntary disclosure that is globally accepted 
(Blanco et al., 2017). 
Therefore, this study contributes to the 
confirmation of stakeholder theory and agency 
theory. The results can be used to advise 
management to implement good corporate 
governance and enhance transparency, 
accountability, and also reduce earnings 
management practices. Besides, this research 
expected to be an input for the regulator to 
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determine corporate governance to reduce 
earnings management practices, and carbon 
emissions management to respond to the problem 
of climate change. 
The next section discusses the stakeholder 
theory and agency theory that used to explain and 
propose the tested hypothesis. Following that, the 
research method section describes how this study 
undertaken. In results and discussion part, the 
research findings are presented and discussed. 
Conclusion and recommendations for further 
studies can be found in the last section of this 
paper. 
 
2. Literature review  
Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory explains how management 
meets the expectations of stakeholders (Freeman, 
2010). According to the theory, paying attention to 
the needs of broader stakeholders is imperative for 
those companies implementing social 
responsibility (Velayutham, 2014). The 
stakeholder pressure is considered to be more 
influential on managers' attitudes in controlling 
social and environmental problems compared to 
regulations or mandatory disclosure rules (Wood 
& Ross, 2006). Neu et al., (1998) found that some 
companies were more responsive to the demands 
of financial stakeholder groups compared to other 
groups such as environmental observers/activists. 
In this case, management issued to responsible for 
balancing conflicting pressures from various 
stakeholders (Brower & Mahajan, 2013). 
 
Agency theory 
Agency theory is a theory that explains the 
relationship between the principal and agent or 
referred by the agency relationship. Smith (1937) 
in his work The Wealth of Nations, states that if 
an organization managed by a person or group 
who are not owners, then there is a possibility 
that the person or group will not work for the 
benefit of the owner (Panda & Leepsa, 2017).  
An agency relationship is a contract between 
the principal and the agent who works to fulfill 
his interest lead to agency conflict (Panda & 
Leepsa, 2017). The agency relations lead to 
conflicts of interest due to the inconsistency of 
interests between agents and principals because 
managers do not always act in the interests of the 
owner (Messier et al., 2008). Agency theory 
helps in applying corporate governance 
mechanisms to control agent actions and replace 
agency conflicts within the company (Panda & 
Leepsa, 2017). 
Agency theory offers a framework linking 
carbon emissions disclosure with corporate 
governance mechanisms. According to the 
theory, a good corporate governance mechanism 
can improve a company's ability to deal with 
existing problems and reduce agency conflict 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). In addition, agency 
theory views carbon emissions reporting as a 
solution to reducing information asymmetry 
between agents and principals (Salewski & 
Zulch, 2014).  
 
Earnings management  
Earnings management is a choice of 
accounting policies selected by managers or 
concrete actions that can affect earnings, to 
achieve a certain profit reporting goal (Scott, 
2015:455). Managers may choose accounting 
policies that support the achievement of certain 
objectives within the limits set by the Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). GAAP 
is flexible, allowing management to use this 
policy to report actual earnings that do not 
accurately reflect the company's economic 
conditions (Prior et al., 2008).  
Earnings management in an opportunistic 
perspective seeks to provide information that can 
mislead investors but protect the performance, 
reputation, and compensation of managers within 
the company. Managers who are indicated to 
carry out earnings management are trying to 
cover up one of these actions by expressing 
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broader social responsibility in the form of 
disclosure of carbon emissions. 
 Disclosure of social responsibility gives rise 
to an image that the company is environmentally 
friendly so that it can increase support from 
stakeholders (Prior et al., 2008). The stakeholders 
will ultimately divert supervision from any 
indication of earnings management with good 
corporate social responsibility performance. 
 
Carbon emission and carbon emission 
disclosure 
Greenhouse gas emissions are referred to as 
carbon emissions because the amount of 
greenhouse gas emissions is often calculated 
based on the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2). 
Concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the 
earth's atmosphere have increased since the start 
of the industrial revolution because at this time 
human activity develops rapidly. Carbon dioxide 
(CO2) is part of a greenhouse gas that must be 
reduced by member countries according to the 
amendment to the Kyoto Protocol (United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCC, 1988). 
The disclosure of carbon emissions which is 
part of social responsibility, regulated in 
Indonesia Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standard (or Pernyataan Standar Akuntansi 
Keuangan/PSAK) No. 1 paragraph 9 concerning 
environmental problems. The disclosure and 
reporting of carbon emissions information in 
Indonesia began to develop after the government 
issued  Presidential Regulation No. 61/2011 
concerning the National Action Plan for 
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions (RAN-
GRK) and Presidential Regulation No. 71 of 
2011  concerning the Implementation of the 
National Greenhouse Gas Inventory (Nainggolan 
& Rohman, 2015). 
The practice of disclosing carbon emissions 
is seen as a form of corporate accountability to 
the public to explain the impact of the company's 
activities on climate change. Further regulations 
on voluntary disclosure of carbon gas emissions 
have not been established by the Indonesian 
Financial Services Authority (Bapepam-LK, 
2002). The BAPEPAM only regulates mandatory 
disclosures required by accounting standards 
through decision No. SE-02 / PM / 2002. 
 
Corporate governance 
Corporate governance defined as a set of 
mechanisms that control companies directly by 
stakeholders' expectations (IICG, 2015). The 
concept of corporate governance started to be an 
important issue to investigate since the separation 
between ownership and management particularly 
after the 1930 (Khan, 2011). Corporate 
governance aims to create added value for 
stakeholders, explain, and enhance the role of the 
board of directors, the board of commissioners, 
management, and shareholders (FCGI, 2001). 
Also, a sound corporate governance mechanism 
is expected to reduce the manipulation activities 
that can be carried out within the company and 
creating value-added. 
 
Earnings management and carbon emissions 
disclosure 
The stakeholder theory explains that 
managers do not only act as agents of the owner 
but also of other stakeholders (Sun et al., 2010). 
As a controller of the decision-making process, 
managers tend to maximize their profits by 
making financial reports that are more 
informative but have an impact on the interests of 
other stakeholders (Prior et al., 2008; Sun et al., 
2010).  
Agency theory explains that as a principal, 
investors naturally want to profit from the funds 
invested. While managers as agents want bonuses 
and compensation in return for their performance. 
Social responsibility expressed to give the 
impression to stakeholders that the company is 
transparent. Companies involved in earnings 
management are behind the company's 
transparent image (Kim et al., 2012). Prior et al., 
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(2008) and Gavana et al., (2017) found earnings 
management had a positive effect on disclosure 
of social responsibility. Disclosure of social 
responsibility is used to cover earnings 
management actions that will have a direct 
impact on stakeholders.  
 Hope et al., (2013) uncovered the extent of 
disclosure of corporate social responsibility can 
be influenced by the interests of opportunistic 
managers. Callery & Perkins (2017) used forensic 
analysis and found that disclosure of carbon 
emissions is related to symbolic management, 
which is to increase the attention of stakeholders 
to the company's non-financial performance. 
H1: Earnings management has a positive effect on 
carbon emissions disclosure 
 
Mechanism of corporate governance  
Size of board of commissioner 
Indonesia adopted a European continental 
legal system that separated the structure of the 
company council into two levels (two-tier system). 
The board of commissioner have a role as a 
supervisor, while the board of directors (including 
management) acts as an executive. The board of 
commissioners uses financial statements to assess 
the performance of the board of directors. 
However, the board of directors often manipulates 
numbers in the records to present good financial 
reports (Nugroho & Eko, 2011). 
According to Anderson et al., (2004), the size 
of the board of commissioners plays an important 
role in monitoring the function of the board of 
directors and reducing agency conflicts. Research 
by Obigbemi et al., (2016) shows that the size of 
the board of commissioners can reduce earnings 
management in line with the background 
knowledge and experience of different board 
members. The larger size of the board of 
commissioners tends to carry out effective 
monitoring mechanisms and encourage disclosure, 
to reduce information asymmetry between 
management and shareholders (Buertey et al., 
2019). In line with previous research, Nasih et al., 
(2019) also found that the size of the board of 
commissioners had a positive effect on the 
disclosure of carbon emissions to achieve 
corporate transparency. 
H2a: The size of the board of commissioners 
moderates the effect of earnings 
management on the carbon-emissions 
disclosure. 
 
Independent board of commissioners 
The mechanism of corporate governance is 
effective if the company has a majority of 
independent boards of commissioners that carry 
out the monitoring function of management 
(Dechow et al., 1996; Velayutham, 2014). The 
monitoring function is carried out to reduce 
opportunistic actions and information asymmetries 
by disclosing relevant information in the annual 
report.  
The independent board of commissioners has 
a higher awareness of the demands in controlling 
carbon emissions compared to management. The 
management considers that investment in 
controlling carbon emissions will only produce 
long-term benefits. While the independent board 
of commissioners has a desire to provide 
transparent information related to policies and 
carbon emissions to various stakeholders (Rupley 
et al., 2012).  
If the carbon emissions disclosure still 
voluntary, management will have the authority to 
decide what kind of information they disclose 
(Bansal et al., 2018). Therefore, the independent 
board of commissioners play an important role in 
encouraging carbon emissions disclosure and 
responsible for stakeholder’s welfare (Bansal et 
al., 2018). Previous studies have found that an 
independent board of commissioners encourages 
companies to disclose carbon emissions (Kilic & 
Kuzey, 2018; Liao et al., 2014; Rupley et al., 
2012) 
H2b: The independent board of commissioners 
moderates the effect of earnings 
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management on the carbon-emissions 
disclosure. 
 
Institutional ownership  
Institutional ownership is a company share 
owned by institutions such as insurance 
companies, banks, investment companies and 
others (Fransiska et al., 2016). Al-Zyoud (2012) 
uncovered that institutional ownership has a 
negative effect on earnings management.  
These results indicate that institutional 
ownership is an effective corporate governance 
mechanism to limit earnings management. In line 
with previous research, Attig et al., (2012) 
explained that institutional investors play a role in 
efficient corporate governance mechanisms to 
reduce information asymmetry and agency 
problems.  
Research Zhou et al., (2018) showed that 
carbon emissions disclosure can be used as a 
corporate communication tool to an investor for 
reducing agency costs and limit the behavior of 
opportunist management. Velayutham (2014) 
found institutional ownership has a positive effect 
on carbon emissions disclosure. This result shows 
that institutional investors have an important role 
in occupying the pressure of stakeholders through 
carbon-emissions disclosure. 
H2c:  Institutional ownership moderates the effect 
of earnings management on the carbon-
emissions disclosure. 
 
Audit committee meetings 
Audit committee meetings are held regularly 
every year to ensure the financial reporting 
process and the disclosure of social responsibility 
function properly (Soliman & Ragab, 2014). 
Audit committee meetings are referring to the 
number of meetings held annually for monitoring 
management activities effectively (Appuhami & 
Tashakor, 2017). Saleh et al., (2007) found that 
audit committee meetings significantly influence 
earnings management.  
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework 
According to Albersmann & Hohenfels 
(2017), a sufficient frequency of meetings 
between 4 and 5 times a year can show the role of 
the audit committee effectively to reduce the 
level of earnings management. At the same time, 
the higher frequency of audit committee meetings 
also helps each member in ensuring the quality of 
Carbon emissions disclosure 
 
 
Control Variables: 
 Firm size 
 Profitability 
 Leverage 
 
Earnings management 
 
  
Corporate Governance Mechanism 
 Board of commisioners 
 Independent board of 
commisioners 
 Institutional ownership 
 Audit committee meetings  
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corporate social responsibility disclosure 
(Appuhami & Tashakor, 2017).  
Furthermore, Allegrini & Greco (2013) and 
Chariri et al., (2018) found the frequency of audit 
committee meetings had a positive effect on the 
disclosure of carbon emissions. The higher 
frequency of audit committee meetings increases 
the oversight function of carbon emission 
disclosures by the management effectively. The 
carbon emissions disclosure illustrates corporate 
transparency which can be used as a means of 
reducing agency problems and information 
asymmetry between majority and minority 
shareholders (Allegrini & Greco, 2013). 
H2d: Audit committee meetings moderates the 
effect of earnings management on the 
carbon-emissions disclosure. 
 
3. Research method 
The population of this study is companies in 
the basic industry and chemical, agriculture, 
energy, transportation sectors listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) between 2014 
and 2018. These sectors are four priority areas 
proposed by the Ministry of National 
Development Planning (or BAPPENAS) refer to 
the Presidential Regulation No. 61 of 2011 
concerning National Action Plan for Reduction of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (or Rencana Aksi 
Nasional Penurunan Emisi Gas Rumah 
Kaca/RAN-GRK). The sample is those 
companies that publish audited annual reports 
during the period 2014 to 2018 in Rupiah. 
 In addition, the sample company did not 
experience loss and disclosed at least one policy, 
or one item related to carbon emissions 
disclosure in the annual report for the period 
2014 - 2018. Having considering these criteria, 
this study obtained a final sample of 12 
companies with a total of 60 observations with 
details in the following table: 
 
   Table 1. Judgmental sampling 
No Criteria 
Number of 
companies 
 Companies in the basic and chemical, agriculture, energy, transportation sectors listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange 2014 – 2018 
116 
1 Companies that do not publish audited annual reports during the period 2014 - 2018 (4) 
2 Companies that implicitly or explicitly do not disclose at least one policy or one item of 
disclosure related to carbon emissions in the annual report for the period 2014 - 2018. 
(80) 
3 The companies use other currency (US$) only (10) 
4 The company suffered a loss (10) 
 Total 12 
 Observation for 5 years (2014-2018) 60 
 
The annual reports were obtained from the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (www.idx.co.id) and 
the company's website. The company's 
sustainability report used to obtain carbon 
emissions disclosure data. Moderate regression  
 
 
analysis (MRA) used to maintain sample 
integration and control the effect of moderating 
variables (Ghozali, 2009:203). Data testing was 
performed using IBM SPSS statistics 23. The 
operational definitions of each variable are shown 
in table 2. 
 
Table 2. Operationalization of variables 
Variable Definition Indicator 
Carbon emissions 
disclosure 
Corporate sustainability disclosure 
related to carbon emissions.  
The number of valuation items disclosed by the company 
based on the carbon emissions disclosure index described in 
table 2. 
Earnings Earnings management proxied by the ΔA     it = α + β1 ΔRit + β2 ΔRit x SIZEit + β3 ΔRit x AGEit 
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management conditional revenue model developed by 
Stubben, 2010. Conditional revenue 
model based on discretionary revenue 
which is the difference between actual 
changes in receivables and estimated 
changes in receivables based on the 
calculation model. 
+ β4 ΔRit x AGE_SQit + β5 ΔRit x GRR_Pit + β6 
ΔRit x GRR_Nit + β7 ΔRit x GRMit + β8 ΔRit x 
GRM_SQit +  it 
 
it = Account receivable 
Rit  = The difference between company income 
SIZE = Natural log of total year-end assets 
AGE = Natural log of company age (years) 
GRM = Gross margin 
SQ = Square of variable 
GRR_P = Adjusted growth revenue (= 0 if negative) 
GRR_N = Adjusted growth revenue (= 0 if positive) 
Δ = Annual change 
The size of the 
board of 
commissioners 
The board of commissioner as a 
supervisor who conducts oversight in 
general or specifically by the budget and 
provides input to the board of directors.  
COMMSIZE = Number of commissioners in the company. 
The independent 
board of 
commissioners 
According to Undang-Undang No. 40 
Tahun, 2007 Perseroan Terbatas 
(UUPT) pasal 120 ayat (2), the 
independent commissioners in good 
corporate governance guidelines come 
from outside parties who are not 
affiliated with major shareholders, 
members of the Board of Directors and 
other members of the Board of 
Commissioners. 
  Number of an 
independent board of 
commissioners 
 
COMMIND =   X 100% 
  Number of all 
commissioners 
 
 
 
 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Institutional ownership is the percentage 
of share ownership owned by the 
institution. 
  Number of share 
ownership 
 
INSOWN =  X 100% 
  Number of shares  
 
Audit Committee 
Meetings 
 
Frequency of audit committee meetings 
conducted to carry out its 
responsibilities. 
AUDIT = Number of meetings conducted by the audit 
committee in the current year. 
Firm Size The size of the company illustrates the 
company's resources. 
SIZE = Natural log of total asset 
Profitability Companies' ability to use their capital to 
obtain revenue (Pahuja, 2009). 
  Net profit  
ROA =  X 100% 
  Total assets  
 
Leverage The ratio used to measure the 
company's assets financed by long-term 
and short-term debt (Pahuja, 2009). 
  The total amount 
of debt 
 
Debt Ratio =  X 100% 
  Total assets  
 
 
Tabel 3. Carbon disclosure checklist 
Category Item 
Climate change: risks and opportunities CC - 1 Assessment/description of the risks (regulatory, physical or 
general) relating to climate change and actions are taken or to be 
taken to manage the risks. 
CC - 2 Assessment/description of current (and future) financial 
implications, business implications and opportunities of climate 
change. 
GHG emissions accounting GHG - 1 Description of the methodology used to calculate GHG 
emissions (e.g. GHG protocol or ISO). 
 GHG – 2 Existence external verification of quantity of GHG emission– if 
so by whom and on what basis. 
GHG - 3 Total GHG emissions – metric tonnes CO2-e emitted. 
GHG – 4 Disclosure of Scopes 1 and 2, or Scope 3 direct GHG emissions. 
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GHG – 5 Disclosure of GHG emissions by sources (e.g. coal, electricity, 
etc.). 
GHG – 6 Disclosure of GHG emissions by facility or segment level. 
GHG - 7 Comparison of GHG emissions with previous years. 
Energy consumption accounting EC - 1 Total energy consumed (e.g. tera-joules or petajoules). 
EC - 2 Quantification of energy used from renewable sources. 
EC - 3 Disclosure by type, facility or segment. 
GHG reduction and cost RC - 1 Detail of plans or strategies to reduce GHG emissions 
RC – 2 Specification of GHG emissions reduction target level and 
target year 
RC – 3 Emissions reductions and associated costs or savings achieved 
to date as a result of the reduction plan 
RC – 4 Cost of future emissions factored into capital expenditure 
planning 
Carbon emission accountability ACC – 1 Indication of which board committee (or another executive 
body) has overall responsibility for actions related to climate 
change 
ACC - 2 Description of the mechanism by which the board (or another 
executive body) reviews the company's progress regarding 
climate change 
Source: Choi et al., (2013) 
 
4. Results and discussion 
The descriptive statistical test serves to describe 
the object in this study including the minimum 
value, maximum value, average, and standard 
deviation. Table 4 shows the results of 
descriptive statistical tests on the variable in this 
study.
Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
EM 60 -76.9053 15.4453 -24.50 10.953 
CED 60 1 15 5.00 4.310 
COMMSIZE 60 2 8 5.27 1.676 
COMMIND 60 0.2000 0.6667 0.41 0.101 
INSOWN 60 0.1397 0.9901 0.67 0.218 
AUDIT 60 2 15 7.57 3.670 
SIZE 60 14.0460 17.7504 15.97 0.984 
ROA 60 0.0008 0.2078 0.08 0.046 
LEV 60 0.0715 0.6637 0.35 0.153 
 
The earnings management (EM) measured 
using conditional revenue model Stubben (2010). 
The calculation of earnings management 
conducted a regression test on each proxy to 
obtain the coefficient value in calculating 
earnings management. Furthermore, the 
minimum value of earnings management is -
76.9053 and the maximum value is 15.4453 with 
a standard deviation of 10.953. A higher standard  
deviation than the average of 24.50 indicates that 
the data distribution is normal. 
 
The carbon emissions disclosure (CED) as 
the dependent variable in this study was assessed 
by the dichotomy score 1 if disclosed and 0 if not 
disclosed. Disclosure of carbon emissions 
assessed by the carbon disclosure project (CDP) 
disclosure checklist, consists of 18 disclosure 
items. Furthermore, a minimum value for the 
level of carbon emission disclosure is obtained, a 
maximum value of 15, an average of 5.00 and a 
standard deviation of 4.310. The largest level of 
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carbon emissions disclosure is owned by 
Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa Tbk. 
The size of the board of commissioners 
(COMMSIZE) as a moderating variable in this 
study measured by the number of members of the 
board of commissioners in a company. The 
maximum value for the board of commissioner’s 
size is 8, the minimum value is 2, the average 
value is 5.27, and the standard deviation is 1.676. 
The smallest size of the board of commissioners 
is owned by Sawit Sumbermas Sarana Tbk. 
While the largest is owned by PP London 
Sumatra Indonesia Tbk and Blue Bird Tbk. 
The independent board of commissioners 
(COMMIND) measured by the number of 
independent boards of commissioners divided by 
the total number of boards of commissioners. 
Thus, the minimum value obtained for the size of 
the independent board of commissioners is 
0.2000, a maximum value of 0.6667, an average 
of 0.41 and a standard deviation of 0.101. Semen 
Baturaja (Persero) Tbk has the smallest board 
size, while the largest is owned by Sampoerna 
Agro Tbk. 
Institutional ownership (INSOWN) in this 
study measured by dividing the number of shares 
owned by the institution with the number of 
shares of the company in circulation. The 
minimum and maximum values for institutional 
ownership are 0.1397 and 0.9901, respectively. 
The lowest level of institutional ownership is 
owned by Arwana Citramulia Tbk. While the 
highest is owned by Semen Indonesia (Persero) 
Tbk. The average value of institutional ownership 
is 0.67 and the standard deviation is 0.218. A 
lower than average standard deviation indicates 
that the diversity of institutional ownership data 
is relatively low. 
Audit committee meetings (AUDIT) 
measured by the number of meetings conducted 
by the audit committee annually, with an average 
of 7.57. The minimum and maximum values are 2 
and 15. The lowest number of audit committee 
meetings are owned by Blue Bird Tbk and the 
highest is Ashashimas Flat Glass Tbk. 
Meanwhile, this variable has a standard deviation 
of 3.670. 
The firm size (SIZE) as a control variable in 
this study measured using the natural log of total 
assets. The minimum and maximum values of 
company size are 14.0460 and 17.7504, 
respectively. This variable has an average value 
of 15.97 and a standard deviation of 0.984. The 
smallest company size is owned by Arwana 
Citramulia Tbk, while the largest is owned by 
Semen Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. 
The profitability measured by using the 
return on assets (ROA), has an average value of 
0.08 while a standard deviation value of 0.046. A 
smaller standard deviation compared to the 
average indicates that there is no large gap 
between the minimum and maximum values of 
the company's profitability. The minimum and 
maximum values for each of these variables are 
0.0008 and 0.2078. The company with the lowest 
level of profitability is owned by Sampoerna 
Agro Tbk and the highest is owned by Arwana 
Citramulia Tbk. 
The next control variable in this study is 
leverage with an average value of 0.35. 
Meanwhile, for the standard deviation, the 
minimum and maximum values for this variable 
are 0.153, 0.0715, and 0.6637, respectively. Japfa 
comfeed Indonesia Tbk has the highest and the 
lowest leverage level owned by Semen Baturaja 
(Persero) Tbk.  
This study uses two regression models. The 
first regression model was used to test hypothesis 
1. Meanwhile, the second model was used to test 
hypotheses 2,3,4 and 5. In the classical 
assumption test, it was found that the normality 
test data was normally distributed with a 
significance level in the two regression models 
built by 0.200 or more greater than 0.05. The 
regression models do not show the problem of 
heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity. Based 
on the regression test results, the analysis results 
are obtained as follows: 
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Table 5. Results of regression analysis without moderation 
Variable Coefficient t-count Sig.  
EM  0.085 2.462 0.017* 
SIZE 1.340 3.903 0.000* 
ROA 4.161 0.426 0.672 
LEV -3.298 -1.188 0.240 
Constanta -4.657 -1.467 0.148 
**Sig. at level 0.05 (p<0.05) 
Notes:  
Model 1: CED = α + β1EM + β2SIZE + β3ROA + β4LEV + e  
EM= earnings management, SIZE= firm size, ROA= profitability, LEV= leverage. 
 
Table 6. Results of moderation regression analysis  
Variable Coefficient t-count Sig.  
EM  0.298 3.688 0.001* 
COMMSIZE -1.061 -2.125 0.039 
COMMIND 1.331 0.260 0.796 
INSOWN -1.689 -0.448 0.656 
AUDIT 0.137 0.584 0.562 
EM*COMMSIZE -0.041 -3.159 0.003* 
EM*COMMIND -3.613 -0.278 0.782 
EM*INSOWN 4.200 0.250 0.803 
EM*AUDIT -132.624 -0.619 0.539 
SIZE 2.623 4.393 0.000* 
ROA 6.817 0.665 0.509 
LEV -3.565 -1.115 0.270 
Constanta -10.325 -2.190 0.034 
**Sig. at level 0.05 (p<0.05) 
Notes:  
Model 2: CED   = α + β1EM + β2COMMSIZE + β3COMMIND + β4INSOWN + β5AUDIT + β6EM*COMMSIZE + 
β7EM*COMMIND + β8EM*INSOWN + β9EM*AUDIT + β10SIZE + β11ROA + β12LEV + e 
EM= earnings management, COMMSIZE= the size of the board of commisioner’s, COMMIND= the independent board of commissioners, 
INSOWN= institutional ownership, AUDIT= audit committee meetings, EM*COMMSIZE= interaction of earnings management with the size 
of the board of commissioners, EM*COMMIND= interaction of earnings management with the independent board of commissioners, 
EM*INSOWN= interaction of earnings management with institutional ownership, EM*AUDIT= interaction of earnings management with 
audit committee meetings, SIZE= firm size, ROA= profitability, LEV= leverage. 
The effect of profit management on carbon 
emission disclosures 
The results of hypothesis 1 (table 5), 
statistically show a significance of 0.017 with a 
positive coefficient value. This result showed that 
H1 accepted. Management that practices earnings 
management uses carbon emission disclosures to 
protect its interests and divert stakeholders' 
awareness of management performance. The 
results support the agency theory's assumptions 
which emphasize that basically, humans tend to 
be selfish (self-interest) and avoid risk. When the 
company is managed by someone or a group of 
people who are not the owner, then the party will 
not work for the benefit of the owner. On the 
other hand, companies must provide benefits for 
stakeholders that have an impact on the 
company's survival.  
One of them is the demands of stakeholders 
in controlling social and environmental issues 
such as carbon emissions. In addition, the results 
of the research support the stakeholder theory 
states that when information asymmetry gets 
higher because management tries to meet the 
demands of stakeholders, so management tends to 
be involved in earnings management. The 
strength of stakeholders and financial 
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performance is related to the level of disclosure 
(Roberts, 1992). 
The results of this study support the research 
of Prior et al., (2008); Velayutham (2014); and 
Gavana et al., (2017) state that disclosure of 
social responsibility is used to cover earnings 
management actions that will have a direct 
impact on stakeholders. The increase of carbon 
emissions disclosure used to create an image that 
the company has good ethics behind the personal 
interests of management. Carbon emissions 
disclosure provides a positive image that will 
affect the company's reputation (Kim et al., 
2012). The disclosure of carbon emissions used 
by management to cover up their mistakes, so the 
company can operate with a good reputation 
(Hemingway & Maclagan, 2014).  
 
The role of corporate governance as a 
moderating variable  
The result of fegression test of earnings 
management interaction variables with the size of 
the board of commissioners on the disclosure of 
carbon emissions can be seen in the table 6. It 
shows that H2a accepted with a significant 
negative coefficient. The board of commissioners 
is proven to be a moderating variable by 
weakening the effect of earnings management on 
the disclosure of carbon emissions. Increasing the 
number of commissioners in a company can 
strengthen the negative influence of earnings 
management on the disclosure of carbon 
emissions.  
The higher the level of earnings management 
moderated by the size of the board of 
commissioners, the lower the level of carbon 
emissions disclosure. This shows that the board 
of commissioners has a role in influencing the 
disclosure of carbon emissions whose level of 
disclosure is not only used as a symbolic form by 
management in covering the opportunist actions 
taken.  
This study supports the results of previous 
studies in Prasetia & Marsono (2015); 
Kusumawati & Nurharjanti (2019) who found 
that the board of commissioners could carry out 
the function of monitoring the earnings 
management practices so that the disclosure of 
carbon emissions was carried out voluntarily. The 
results of the study are in line with agency theory 
which states that good corporate governance 
mechanisms are supported by the greater size of 
the board of commissioners so that it can 
demonstrate corporate transparency through 
disclosure of carbon emissions. Carbon emissions 
disclosure not only carried out as a form of 
fulfillment in diverting stakeholder's attention.  
Table 6 shows that H2b is rejected with a 
negative coefficient of 0.782. This result can be 
influenced by the possibility that the existence of 
an independent board of commissioners is only 
used to meet the demands of the regulation but 
does not have the aim to improve good corporate 
governance in the company. The results of the 
study contradict Machmuddah et al., (2017) who 
found that the increasing proportion of the 
independent board of commissioners would 
improve the supervisory function to weaken the 
positive influence of earnings management on 
disclosure of carbon emissions. 
 In addition, this result is certainly not in line 
with agency theory which explains that an 
independent board of commissioners carries out a 
monitoring function on management performance 
to disclose relevant financial and non-financial 
performance information. On the other hand, the 
results of this study are in line with Hermiyetti & 
Manik (2013) that the proportion of the 
independent board of commissioners does not 
carry out the supervisory function so that the 
majority shareholders have a greater role in 
controlling the activities of the company. 
Table 6 indicates that H2c is rejected with a 
positive coefficient of 0.803. The absence of a 
moderating role in institutional ownership in this 
study could be due to institutional ownership not 
playing an effective role in carrying out the 
monitoring function of earnings management 
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practices and disclosure of carbon emissions.  
This research is in line with  Kusumaningtyas & 
Farida (2015) which shows that institutional 
owners tend to focus on short-term earnings, so 
management is forced to manipulate earnings. 
The results of this study contradict the findings 
Akbas & Canikli (2018) that companies with 
higher levels of institutional ownership tend to 
disclose carbon emissions. Institutional investors 
are involved in monitoring accounting policy 
choices made by management to reduce earnings 
management practices (Ajay & Madhumati, 
2015). 
Table 6 shows H2d is rejected with a negative 
coefficient of 0.539. This result can be influenced 
by the possibility that the audit committee holds a 
meeting to discuss the interests of the company 
which is urgent compared to overseeing 
management. This study in line with Choi et al., 
(2004); and Leksono & Butar (2018) which states 
that audit committee meetings cannot find errors 
in accounting practices by management and 
affect the level of carbon emissions disclosure. 
The results of this study contradict Sun et al., 
(2010); and Chariri et al., (2018) who found that 
audit committee members meet at least 5 times a 
year to improve the quality of carbon emissions 
disclosure and financial reporting better. 
Moreover, this study found that firm size has 
a positive and significant effect on carbon 
emissions disclosure. The results are in line with 
Velayutham (2014); and Faisal et al., (2018) 
which states that companies with greater levels of 
visibility and resources have intensive efforts to 
overcome environmental problems and tend to 
disclose carbon emissions information 
voluntarily. Profitability does not affect carbon-
emissions disclosure. This result showed that 
financial performance not always be considered 
in assessing the company's carbon emissions 
disclosure.  
Conversely, companies with high 
profitability do not increase the disclosure of 
carbon emissions information to demonstrate 
good financial performance (Pradini & Kiswara, 
2013). These results are not in line with previous 
research conducted by Faisal et al., (2018) which 
shows that companies with high profitability tend 
to disclose carbon emissions information.  
Moreover, the leverage does not affect the 
disclosure of carbon emissions, because the 
company has gained good trust from debtholders. 
Thus, the company feels no need to disclose 
carbon emissions. This result is contrary to Faisal 
et al., (2018) which states that disclosure of 
carbon emissions information is done by 
companies to increase the credibility of 
debtholders. Furthermore, the results of this study 
contradict with the agency theory which states 
that the independent board of commissioners has 
a role in carrying out the monitoring function of 
management performance to disclose relevant 
financial and non-financial performance 
information.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This study aims to examine the effect of 
earnings management on carbon emissions 
disclosure by corporate governance mechanisms 
as moderating variables in the basic industrial 
and chemical, agricultural, energy, and 
transportation sectors listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange. The results of this study provide 
empirical evidence that earnings management has 
a significant positive effect on carbon emissions 
disclosure.  
In addition, this study shows that the board 
of commissioners has a role in strengthening the 
negative influence of earnings management on 
carbon-emissions disclosure. The board of 
commissioners has a role in influencing carbon 
emissions disclosure which is not only used as a 
symbolic form to cover earnings management 
actions.  
The independent board of directors has no 
role in influencing earnings management on 
carbon-emissions disclosure. The role of the 
independent board of commissioners in carrying 
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out monitoring function, not comparable to the 
majority shareholders who have more control in 
monitoring management activities.  
This study provides evidence that the level of 
institutional ownership does not play a role in the 
effect of earnings management on disclosure of 
carbon emissions because institutional owners do 
not play an effective role in carrying out 
monitoring functions on management 
performance.  
Moreover, the audit committee meetings 
cannot either weaken or strengthen the 
relationship of earnings management with 
disclosure of carbon emissions because oversight 
of management performance is less of a concern 
on the agenda of meetings conducted by the audit 
committee. Thus, this research has proven that 
disclosure of carbon emissions can be used by 
companies to shift the awareness of stakeholders 
to the existence of earnings management 
practices in a company.  
This research has several contributions both 
theoretically, practically, and in the policy. The 
theoretical contribution of this study provides 
support for the application of agency theory with 
the acceptance of the first hypothesis, namely the 
positive effect of earnings management on 
disclosure of carbon emissions. The findings 
support the stakeholder theory which states that 
when information asymmetry gets higher, 
management tends to be involved in earnings 
management to meet the demands of 
stakeholders. 
Second, the results can be used as a reference 
for companies included in the basic industrial and 
chemical, agricultural, energy, transportation 
sectors to be able to review the functions of each 
aspect of corporate governance to achieve 
effective implementation of good corporate 
governance, which of course will affect 
management performance and improve the 
quality of carbon-emissions disclosure.  
Third, this research is expected to be able to 
make policy contributions to the government as 
the main regulator in Indonesia to establish laws 
that specifically regulate accounting standards 
that guide the preparation of financial statements 
and protect the interests of the general public, 
particularly investors and creditors.  
This study also has limitations, including the 
small number of samples and the possibility of 
subjectivity in assessing carbon emissions 
disclosure based on the interpretations of 
researchers. Future studies are expected to 
provide evidence of disclosure of carbon 
emissions in other business sectors, for instance 
mining industries. 
 
References 
Aggarwal, R., & Dow, S. (2011). Greenhouse gas 
emissions mitigation and firm value: a study 
of large north-American and European firms. 
SSRN Electronic Journal, 1–37. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1929453 
Ajay, R., & Madhumati, R. (2015). Institutional 
ownership and earnings management in 
India. Indian Journal of Corporate 
Governance, 8(2), 119–136. 
Akbas, H. E., & Canikli, S. (2018). Determinants 
of voluntary greenhouse gas emission 
disclosure: an empirical investigation on 
Turkish firms. Sustainability MDPI, 11(1). 
Al-Zyoud, A. A. (2012). The effects of chairman 
independence and ownership structure on 
earnings management. World Applied 
Sciences Journal, 17(8), 934–940. 
Albersmann, B. T., & Hohenfels, D. (2017). Audit 
committees and earnings management – 
evidence from the german two-tier board 
system. Schmalenbach Business Review, 
18(2), 147–178. 
Allegrini, M., & Greco, G. (2013). Corporate 
boards, audit committees and voluntary 
disclosure: evidence from Italian Listed 
Companies. Journal of Management 
Governance, 17(1), 187–216. 
Anderson, C. R., Mansi, S. A., & Reeb, D. M. 
(2004). Board characteristics, accounting 
report integrity, and the cost of debt. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 37(3), 315–
342. 
 
84 
Astari, Saraswati & Purwanti/Jurnal Dinamika Akuntansi dan Bisnis Vol. 7(1), 2020, pp 69-86 
 
Appuhami, R., & Tashakor, S. (2017). The impact 
of audit committee characteristics on CSR 
disclosure: an analysis of Australian firms. 
Australian Accounting Review, 27(4), 1–21. 
Attig, N., Cleary, S., Ghoul, S. E., & Guedhami, 
O. (2012). Institutional investment horizon 
and investment–cash flow sensitivity. Journal 
of Banking & Finance, 36(4), 1164–1180. 
Bansal, S., Lopez-Perez, M. V, & Rodriguez-
Ariza, L. (2018). Board independence and 
corporate social responsibility disclosure: the 
mediating role of the presence of family 
ownership. Administrative Sciences, 8(3), 33–
54. 
Bapepam-LK. (2002). Surat edaran ketua 
Bapepam no. SE-02/PM/2002 tentang 
pedoman penyajian dan pengungkapan 
laporan keuangan emiten atau perusahaan 
publik. Kementerian Keuangan Republik 
Indonesia. 
Blanco, C., Caro, F., & Corbett, C. J. (2017). An 
inside perspective on carbon disclosure. 
Business Horizons, 60(5), 635–646. 
Borghei-Ghomi, Z., & Leung, P. (2013). An 
empirical analysis of the determinants of 
greenhouse gas voluntary disclosure in 
Australia. Sciedu Press, 2(1). 
https://doi.org/10.5430/afr.v2n1p110 
Brower, J., & Mahajan, V. (2013). Driven to be 
good: a stakeholder theory perspective on the 
drivers of corporate social performance. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 117, 313–331. 
Buertey, E., Sun, E., Lee, J. S., & Hwang, J. 
(2019). Corporate social responsibility and 
earnings management: the moderating effect 
of corporate governance mechanisms. 
Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Environmental Management, 1–16. 
Callery, P. J., & Perkins, J. (2017). Unmasking 
symbolic management: evidence from 
voluntary corporate carbon disclosures. 
University of California. 
Chariri, A., Januarti, I., & Yuyetta, E. N. (2018). 
Audit committee characteristics and carbon 
emission disclosure. E3S Web of 
Conferences. 
Chen, Y. C., Elder, R. J., & Hsieh, Y.-M. (2007). 
Corporate governance and earnings 
management: The implications of corporate 
governance best-practice principles for 
Taiwanese listed companies. Journal of 
Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 
3(2), 73–105. 
Choi, B. B., Lee, D., & Psaros, J. (2013). An 
analysis of Australian company carbon 
emission disclosures. Pacific Accounting 
Review, 25(1), 58–79. 
Choi, J., Jeon, K., & Park, J. (2004). The role of 
audit committees in decreasing earnings 
management: Korean evidence. International 
Journal Accounting, Auditing and 
Performance Evaluation, 1(1), 37–60. 
Coburn, J., Donahue, S. H., & Jayanti, S. (2011). 
Disclosing climate risks & opportunities in 
SEC filings: A guide for corporate 
executives, attourneys & directors. Ceres, 
February. 
http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/disclo
sing-climate-risks-2011/view 
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. 
(1996). Causes and consequences of earnings 
manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to 
enforcement actions by the SEC. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 13(1), 
1–36. 
Elyasih, J., Tang, Q., & Len, Y.-C. (2018). 
Corporate governance and carbon 
transparency: Australian experience. 
Accounting Research Journal, 31(3), 405–
422. 
Faisal, F., Andiningtyas, E. D., Achmad, T., 
Haryanto, H., & Meiranto, W. (2018). The 
content and determinants of greenhouse gas 
emission disclosure: Evidence from 
Indonesian companies. Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Environmental 
Management, 1–10. 
FCGI. (2001). Peranan dewan komisaris dan 
komite audit dalam pelaksanaan corporate 
governance (tata kelola perusahaan). Forum 
for Corporate Governance in Indonesia. 
Fransiska, Y., Endang, R. A., & Purwanto, N. 
(2016). Pengaruh kepemilikan institusional, 
kepemilikan manajerial, dan kebijakan 
dividen terhadap kebijakan hutang pada 
perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di 
bursa efek Indonesia tahun 2012-2014. 
Jurnal Riset Mahasiswa Akuntansi Unikama, 
4(1). 
 
85 
Astari, Saraswati & Purwanti/Jurnal Dinamika Akuntansi dan Bisnis Vol. 7(1), 2020, pp 69-86 
 
 
 
Freeman, R. E. E. al. (2010). Stakeholder theory-
the state of the art. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Gavana, G., Gottardo, P., & Maoisello, A. M. 
(2017). Earnings management and csr 
disclosure. Family vs. non-family firms. 
Sustainability MDPI, 9(12), 1–21. 
Ghozali, I. (2009). Aplikasi analisis multivariate 
dengan program SPSS. UNDIP. 
Haniffa, R. M., & Cooke, T. E. (2002). Culture, 
corporate governance and disclosure in 
Malaysian corporations. A Journal of 
Accounting, Finance, and Business Studies 
ABACUS, 38(3), 317–349. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6281.00112 
Hemingway, C. A., & Maclagan, P. W. (2014). 
Managers’ personal values as drivers of 
corporate social responsibility. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 50(1), 33–44. 
Hermiyetti, & Manik, E. N. (2013). The influence 
of good corporate governance mechanism on 
earnings management: empirical study in 
Indonesian stock exchange listed company 
for periods of 2006-2010. Indonesian Capital 
Market Review, 5(1), 52–63. 
Hope, O. K., Thomas, W. B., & Vyas, D. (2013). 
Financial reporting quality of U.S private and 
public firms. The Accounting Review, 88(5), 
1715–1742. 
IICG. (2015). Corporate governance perception 
index. http://www.iicg.org/agenda-iicg/21-
corporate-governance-perception-index 
(accessed February 10 2019) 
Khan, H. (2011). A literature review of corporate 
governance. International Conference on E-
Business, Management and Economics 
IPEDR. 
Kilic, M., & Kuzey, C. (2018). The effect of 
corporate governance on carbon emission 
disclosures: evidence from turkey. 
International Journal of Climate Change 
Strategies and Management, 33(1), 115–144. 
Kim, Y., Park, M. S., & Wier, B. (2012). Is 
earnings quality associated with corporate 
social responsibility? The Accounting Review, 
87(3), 761–796. 
Klein, A. (2002). Audit committee, board of 
director characteristics, and earnings 
management. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 33, 375–400. 
Kusumaningtyas, M., & Farida, D. N. (2015). 
Pengaruh kompetensi komite audit, aktivitas 
komite audit dan kepemilikan institusional 
terhadap manajemen laba. Jurnal Akuntansi 
Indonesia, 4(1), 66–82. 
Kusumawati, E., & Nurharjanti, N. N. (2019). 
Manajemen laba, pengungkapan corporate 
social responsibility (csr) dengan corporate 
governance sebagai variabel moderasi. The 
9th University Research Colloqium, 163–173. 
Leksono, A. A., & Butar, S. B. (2018). Pengaruh 
good corporate governance dan karakteristik 
perusahaan terhadap pengungkapan corporate 
social responsibility. Jurnal Akuntansi Bisnis, 
16(1), 1–18. 
Liao, L., Luo, L., & Tang, Q. (2014). Gender 
diversity, board independence, environmental 
committee and greenhouse gas disclosure. 
The British Accounting Review, 4(4), 409–
424. 
Machmuddah, Z., Syafruddin, M., Muid, D., & 
Utomo, S. D. (2017). Manajemen laba, 
pengungkapan lingkungan perusahaan dan 
mekanisme tata kelola perusahaan. Jurnal 
Dinamika Akuntansi Dan Bisnis, 4(1), 55–72. 
Mansor, N., Che-Ahmad, A., Ahmad-Zaluki, N. 
A., & Osman, A. H. (2013). Corporate 
governance and earnings management: A 
study on the Malaysian family and non-
family owned PLCs. Procedia Economics 
and Finance, 7, 221–229. 
Messier, W. F., Glover, S. M., & Prawitt, D. F. 
(2008). Auditing & assurance services: a 
systematic approach (Sixth). The Mc Graw-
Hill Companies, Inc. 
Nainggolan, N. E., & Rohman, A. (2015). 
Pengaruh struktur corporate governance 
terhadap pengungkapan lingkungan. 
Diponegoro Journal of Accounting, 4(2), 1-9. 
Nasih, M., Harymawan, I., Paramitasari, Y. I., & 
Handayani, A. (2019). Carbon emissions, 
firm size, and corporate governance structure: 
evidence from the mining and agricultural 
industries in Indonesia. Sustainability MDPI, 
11(9), 1–14. 
Neu, D., Warsame, H., & Pedwell, K. (1998). 
Managing public impressions: environmental 
disclosures in annual report. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 23(3), 265–282. 
 
86 
Astari, Saraswati & Purwanti/Jurnal Dinamika Akuntansi dan Bisnis Vol. 7(1), 2020, pp 69-86 
 
Neviana. (2010). Triple bottom line: lebih dari 
sekadar profit. Swa.Co.Id. 
https://swa.co.id/swa/my-article/triple-
bottom-line-lebih-dari-sekadar-profit 
(accessed January 26 2019). 
Nugroho, B. Y., & Eko, U. (2011). Board 
characteristics and earnings management. 
Journal of Administrative Science & 
Organization, 18(1), 1–10. 
Obigbemi, I. F., Omolehinwa, E. O., Mukoro, D O 
Ben-Caleb, E., & Olusanmi, O. A. (2016). 
Earnings management and board structure: 
evidence from Nigeria. SAGE Open, 6(3), 1–
15. 
Panda, B., & Leepsa, N. M. (2017). Agency 
theory: review of theory and evidence on 
problems and perspectives. Indian Journal of 
Corporate Governance, 10(1), 74–95. 
Pradini, H. S., & Kiswara, E. (2013). The analysis 
of information content towards greenhouse 
gas emissions disclosure in Indonesia’s 
companies. Diponegoro Journal of 
Accounting, 2(2), 1–12. 
Prasetia, D., & Marsono. (2015). Analisis 
pengaruh manajemen laba terhadap 
pengungkapan corporate social responsibility 
dengan corporate governance sebagai 
variabel moderasi. Diponegoro Journal of 
Accounting, 4(1), 1–12. 
Prior, D., Surroca, J., & Tribo, J. A. (2008). Are 
socially responsible managers really ethical? 
Exploring the relationship between earnings 
management and corporate social 
responsibility. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 16(3), 160–177. 
Peraturan presiden nomor 71 tahun 2011 tentang 
penyelenggaraan inventarisasi gas rumah 
kaca nasional, (2011). 
Peraturan presiden republik indonesia nomor 61 
tahun 2011, 1 (2011). 
Roberts, R. W. (1992). Determinants of corporate 
social responsibility disclosure: an 
application of stakeholder theory. Accounting 
Organizations and Society, 17(6), 595–612. 
Rupley, K. H., Brown, D., & Marshall, R. S. 
(2012). Governance, media and the quality of 
environmental disclosure. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 31(6), 610–
640. 
 
Saleh, N. M., Iskandar, T. M., & Rahmat, M. M. 
(2007). Audit committee characteristics and 
earnings management: evidence from 
Malaysia. Asian Review of Accounting, 15(2), 
147–163. 
Salewski, M., & Zulch, H. (2014). The association 
between corporate social responsibility and 
earnings quality. HHL Working Paper Series. 
Scott, W. R. (2015). Financial accounting theory 
(Seventh). Pearson. 
Smith, A. (1937). An inquiry into the nature and 
causes of the wealth of nations. The Modern 
Library. 
Soliman, M. M., & Ragab, A. A. (2014). Audit 
committee effectiveness, audit quality and 
earnings management: an empirical study of 
the listed companies in Egypt. 
ResearchJournal of Finance and Accounting, 
5(2), 155–166. 
Sun, N., Salama, A., Hussainey, K., & Habbash, 
M. (2010). Corporate environmental 
disclosure, corporate governance and 
earnings management. Managerial Auditing 
Journal, 25(7), 679–700. 
UNFCC. (1988). Kyoto Protocol to the unites 
nations framework convention on climate 
change. 
Velayutham, E. (2014). Voluntary disclosure of 
greenhouse gas emissions, corporate 
governance and earnings management: 
Australian evidence. In Tesis. University of 
Southern Quennsland. Australia. 
Wood, D., & Ross, D. G. (2006). Environmental 
social controls and capital investments: 
Australian evidence. Accounting and 
Finance, 46, 677–695. 
World Resources Institute. (2015). A global look 
at mandatory greenhouse gas reporting 
programs. http://www.wri.org/ 
blog/2015/05/global‐look‐mandatory‐
greenhouse‐gas‐reporting‐programs  
Zhou, Z., Zhou, H., Peng, D., Chen, X., & Li, S. 
(2018). Carbon disclosure, financial 
transparency, and agency cost ： evidence 
from Chinese manufacturing listed 
companies. Emerging Markets Finance and 
Trade, 54(12), 2669–2686. 
